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Collected in this issue are a diverse array of articles from some of American sociology‘s most prominent 
theorists and some whose careers are just beginning. Each article stands alone and is well worth reading 
independent of the others. But in considering the issue as a whole, I see several themes that are central to 
―modern‖ (and perhaps democratic) social thought, among them: the fluctuating, morphing idea of knowledge 
in modern democratic society, globalization and power, our perennial and necessary conversation with the 
specter of Marx, and finally, the possible relationships between social theory and social justice. To follow is a 
modest effort to contextualize these themes in the several articles comprising this special issue. 
The first three essays address the mutable conception of knowledge in a contemporary Western democracy in 
one fashion or another. Typically, we frame this issue as a conflict between positivistic and interpretive and/or 
critical knowledge. These three articles shift the terrain from the dueling polarities of explaining versus 
understanding to an arguably more evocative ground: the supremacy and possibility of reason. 
Often reason and rationality are held to be higher processes when compared with baser human characteristics 
such as emotion. Recent work, however, indicates that emotion is important, perhaps primary, in producing 
consciousness, identity, memory, and decision-making (Damasio 1999, 2003; LeDoux 1996). Jonathan Turner, 
our first theorist, has been developing a sociological theory of emotion that has significant implications for our 
understanding of cognition, action, and social organization. In his work here, ―The Stratification of Emotions: 
Some Preliminary Generalizations,‖ Turner presents preliminary ideas and generalizations about the 
stratification of emotion. He lays the groundwork for the theory of stratification by arguing that emotion works 
not only to bind us to social groups and institutions, but is also the fundamental source of acts of extreme 
violence, such as terrorism. Emotion also works to create role distance from economic and educational 
institutions (both key factors in the modern ideal of democracy) and produces repressed shame experienced as 
alienation. In a significant contribution, Turner shows how emotion, like class, status, and power, is socially 
stratified and works to replicate inequalities. Rightly, Turner concludes that ―the sociology of emotions will 
thus be at the center of just about any topic of interest to sociologists.‖ 
Although Jon‘s intent is not to speak to the democratic project, his subject matter is of primary concern. If by 
democracy we mean ―that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected 
and mutually binding consultation‖ (Tilly 2007:13–14); and if the ―attraction of democracy lies in the refusal to 
accept in principle any conception of the political good other than that generated by ‗the people‘ themselves‖ 
(Held 2006:260); and if a basic assumption in back of consultation and the generation of political good is a 
citizenry capable of reason, then the issues of how emotion works in tandem with or contrary to reason and how 
it is stratified in a society are upmost concerns for democracy and sociology. It is also interesting to note that 
Turner implies that the modern concern with equality is more complex than class, status, and power. 
A reasoning citizenry is predicated upon knowledge. This, of course, is one of the motivations behind the 
freedom of the press and the importance of education in modernity. As Martineau (2003:203) observes, ―In 
countries where there is any popular Idea of Liberty, the universities are considered its stronghold.‖ But 
according to Sam Han, our second theorist, something is happening to knowledge generally, and by implication 
to the way university students see and apprehend it. In ―Theorizing New Media: Reflexivity, Knowledge, and 
the Web 2.0,‖ Han argues that the modern view of knowledge is progressive and linear, building incrementally 
into a rational, stable whole. However, Han argues that information media have negatively impacted this 
possibility. The idea that the medium through which knowledge or information is transmitted affects knowledge 
is not new. For example, Lyotard (1984:4) argues that any information ―not translatable in this way will be 
abandoned and that the direction of new research will be dictated by the possibility of its eventual results being 
translatable into computer language.‖ 
In response, many have suggested that this new media will create a new democratization of intellectual activity 
and knowledge. Han, however, says no. Drawing on Scott Lash‘s notion of reflexivity as non-linearity, Han 
argues that Web 2.0 transforms knowledge and sociability. Rather than being a base for a new democratization 
of knowledge, Han sees these media technologies as ―responsible for the queering of modernist conceptions of 
knowledge, including its circulation, production and functionality.‖ And he encourages us to risk the possibility 
that the new technologies have implications for not only knowledge and the way we connect with others, but 
also what it means to be human. 
In ―Problems of Knowledge and Problems of Order,‖ Linda Derksen also invites us to reconsider the modernist 
notion of knowledge. In a provocative argument Derksen examines the implications of DNA profiling for our 
cultural understanding of objectivity as it is found in law, justice, courts, and the penal system. She documents 
the moment when the subjective discretion of a scientist was replaced by objective fact. The facticity of DNA, 
she reasons, was dependent not upon the lone scientist model of discovery, where ―human reason reigns 
supreme in the attempt to divest nature of its secrets‖; rather, DNA became an objective fact through newly 
established communities of practice where meaning was assigned and constrained by broader cultural norms 
and practices. Derksen documents the processes of creating new social structures around this knowledge and the 
―resulting new forms of social order.‖ Here we are taken back to Durkheim‘s insight that there is an intrinsic 
relationship between social and cognitive orders. But Derksen also moves us forward to see that the boundaries 
among agency, society, and nature are permeable at best, with the substances most likely mutually constituted 
in an ongoing interplay. Derksen‘s work obviously prompts us to question the modernist notion of discovery. 
But more than that, she argues that there is much for us to learn about society and sociology: ―Differences 
which have split the discipline, such as the scientific validity of qualitative versus quantitative methods, have 
the potential to be dissolved, as there is no authoritative pattern from the natural sciences to emulate.‖ 
In our next piece, ―Enclosures, Enclaves, and Entrapment,‖ Bryan Turner shifts our attention from the vexing 
problems of knowledge to a consideration of globalization, power, and threats to liberal democracy. 
Globalization is generally understood as social processes that increase the flows of information, people, goods, 
and services across national boundaries. These processes involve the formation of global institutions and cities 
(Sassen 2007) and increasing levels of free trade and integration of national economies (Stiglitz 2002). 
Globalization also brought with it sets of ideas about the definition of society and liberal democracy and 
citizenship. As John Urry (2006:168) points out, sociology was founded on the idea of society as nation-state: 
―To the extent there is something called ‗society,‘ then this should be seen as a sovereign social entity with a 
nation-state at its center that organizes the rights and duties of each citizen.‖ Globalization threatens to de-
center the state and thus has ramifications for democracy. There have been attempts at rethinking this issue. 
Among the ideas pointed out by Turner are semi-citizenship, late-modern citizenship, and a broader sociological 
focus on human rights rather than states and citizens. 
However, Turner argues, these attempts fall short because there are contemporary developments that limit the 
social mobility implied by globalization. These developments leave the state centered but imply restrictions of 
democratic freedoms. Turner argues that in response to factors such as religious fundamentalism, terrorism, 
fears associated with pandemics, and rising levels of crime, conflict, and incivility, states have developed new 
forms of control and enclosure, severely limiting mobility and creating a new governmentality. Turner 
characterizes this shift as the enclave society. In response to these threats, governments enclose identified 
groups through walls (as in Baghdad, the West Bank, and the United States–Mexican border), gated 
communities, increased surveillance, hidden mechanisms in the housing and mortgage markets, stricter 
immigration and naturalization policies, and so forth. Like Jon Turner, Bryan Turner shows us a new or 
different sort of inequality, one he characterizes as the mobility gap. Speaking specifically of walls, but 
certainly apropos to enclavement as a whole, Bryan points out that limiting mobility ―raises serious problems 
for any liberal democratic theory and for values associated with diversity, multiculturalism and tolerance.‖  
In our next two pieces we turn to considerations of Marx. Marx has always been troubling, intentionally so—
changing the way we think about the social world is at the core of any Marxian project. Our two commentators 
of Marx continue in this unsettling discourse. In ―Post-Marxist Trajectories: Diagnosis, Criticism, Utopia,‖ 
Chamsy el-Ojeili provides a thoughtful and thought-provoking journey through some of the problems that post-
Marxism addresses, including issues of history, subjectivity, ethics, positivism, vanguardism, and democracy. 
el-Ojeili then historicizes post-Marxism by exploring some of the implications of what he calls a ―post-1999 
return of utopian reference and expansive social theorizing,‖ which ―take some of the wind out of the sails of 
the idea of post-Marxism as a successor discourse to Marxism.‖ el-Ojeili leaves us unsettled to ponder the 
indispensable although not self-sufficient place of Marx for anyone interested in studying society. 
Charles Lemert continues to unsettle in ―Thinking the Unthinkable/Global Realities: Eleven Theses on Marx‘s 
Eleventh Thesis.‖ The first thing to notice about Lemert‘s piece is that it does not look right—the font changes, 
the structure of the text varies, there‘s no abstract, and no apparent references. Thus, even before we read a 
single word, Lemert disquiets us. When we do read, he continues to invite us to move out of our comfort zone 
by his choice of topic. Lemert takes to task the possibility of Marx‘s statement: ―The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.‖ But rather than questioning the possibility of 
changing the world, Lemert interrogates the possibility of there being such a world. As Lemert rightly points 
out, Marx‘s idea of changing the world is based on an ontological assumption: there exists a singular, objective 
entity capable of being guided and changed. Marx was concerned with the ontological status of society as well: 
the material world of production constituted its ontological base. Today, however, Lemert tells us that the 
metaphysical subtleties of the commodity have played out on a global scale and have thus torn asunder the 
possibility of such a social world. Lemert asks, ―How is it possible to think of the world as lived reality if in the 
place of a singularity there are pluralities?‖ Material capacities, he reasons, ―outrun any normal condition of 
human understanding‖; ideas such as society, community, and humanity become at best ephemeral shadows of 
days gone by. Lemert, however, does not offer solutions. He leaves us with questions and interrogations, which, 
I think, are prerequisites to any form of theoretical (or democratic) thinking. Lemert and el-Ojeili leave us with 
questions and not answers; they invite us to be as unsettled about our world as Marx was his. 
Our final paper is unique in its reach. Not only is it provocatively eclectic, it is also a clarion call for the role of 
theory and theorizing in the cause of social justice. In ―Grounded and Indigenous Theories and the Politics of 
Pragmatism,‖ Norm Denzin advocates for a theoretical methodology that begins in the collaboration of data and 
concepts and then reaches to Cornel West‘s prophetic pragmatism, Patricia Hill Collins‘ feminist epistemology, 
and Ron Pelias‘ methodology of the heart. Denzin employs his theoretical montage to help make better 
conceptual and political sense of indigenous discourses and post-colonialism. Doing so allows him to first be 
cautious of and sensitive to difficulties associated with a person of privilege speaking to or about colonized 
people (whether found in or out of a modern nation). This emphasis also places to the fore the idea that 
theorizing about social justice and equity is as much pedagogical as it is theoretical; it is meant to embrace and 
teach and bring change. For Denzinorm theory is a form of representation and thus entails an ethic of 
responsibility, not only to proper representation but also to our own authentic emotional involvement. Denzin‘s 
approach to theory is ―avowed in its commitment to the project of social justice and radical progressive 
democracy. But there are no absolute truths, no absolute principles. The moral inquirer enacts a politics of love 
and care, an ethic of hope and forgiveness.‖ 
By way of closing this introduction, please know that what I propose here is simply one reading, one way of 
making these diverse theoretical statements say something collectively. Whether you use my reading to frame 
your own or not, I invite you to dive fully into the ideas presented by our theorists. Theory is the most volatile, 
dynamic, pregnant, and vibrant area of our discipline. Social and sociological theories have in the long run 
defied every attempt to corral and subdue them. Our theories refuse to stay categorized into a grand narrative 
and they refuse to behave. They come at us from every angle imaginable and they invite and challenge us to 
think something new; to be so overcome by an idea that our mind is compelled to ―travel anywhere and by any 
means, to re-make itself if necessary, in order to find out‖ (Mills 1959:105). I hope you find fodder for such 
passion in these pages. 
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